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Pragmatist Historiography in 
Unmodern Philosophy and Modern
Philosophy
Phillip Deen
1 It is tempting to dismiss the first half of Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy. At
first blush, it would not seem to be essential to Dewey’s foremost concern to provide a
naturalized account of knowing that avoids the hoary philosophical dualisms of body/
mind, thing/person, material/ideal, and practical/theoretical. The load-bearing chapters
would  seem to  be  in  the  latter  philosophical  half  in  which he  takes  on  the  task  of
developing a positive account rather than the early historical half in which he explains
how the philosophical tradition came to be in this unfortunate position. To those familiar
with Reconstruction in Philosophy and The Quest for Certainty,  the account of the rise of
epistemology  as  the  core  of  western  philosophy  may  seem  familiar  and,  therefore,
unnecessary. Though Dewey delves deeper into medieval and modern figures than in his
other  historical  accounts,  the  outline  of  the  historical  account  is  largely  the  same.
Further,  you  could  also  accuse  Dewey  have  written  a  poor  history.  As  a  work  of
contemporary intellectual history, it suffers. It is both too broad and too narrow, focusing
on a particular philosophical  problem while also being broad and unrestrained in its
summaries of various eras. And there is little-to-none of the rigorous citation or reliance
on statistics that mark much of today’s historical writing. As tempting as it might be, I
believe it would be a great error to ignore the historical half of Dewey’s philosophical
history of modernity. In Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, the first half does not
report  and  the  second  half  argue.  Rather,  the  historical  account  is  a  philosophical
argument.
2 To make my case, I will turn to the broader topic of pragmatist historiography – the
principles,  theory  and  history  of  historical  writing.  “History”  has  various  meanings,
including: 1) the actual events of the past insofar as they are connected to humanity; 2)
philosophy of history, which presents an account of the rational ordering of history or its
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underlying rationality as in Hegel. This includes a periodization of the events of the past
and an account of the mechanism by which those events proceed; and 3) the discipline of
history, including principles governing how one is to study and recount the actual events.
There are threads of each in Dewey’s vast corpus. Within his work and that of other
pragmatists, one can find intimations of a broader theory of how human events proceed,
their mechanisms, and what sort of underlying rationality (if any) is being expressed.
However, the concern here is with the discipline of history; that is, with how to study and
recount historical events.
3 I argue here that Dewey’s historical account of the unfortunate rise of epistemology is an
example of a broader pragmatist theory of the discipline of history. This theory of history
holds that value-free, objective reporting of past events is ultimately impossible. Rather,
historical  writing  is  inevitably  a  history  of  the  present  and  shot  through  with  our
concerns and judgment. Once I have provided a sketch of pragmatist historiography, both
in Dewey’s work and others’, we can return to see how this framework informs Unmodern
Philosophy.
⁂
4 Cushing Strout detailed what he called the “pragmatic revolt in American history” by
authors such as Carl Becker and Charles Beard (Strout 1958). Close to the heart of this
revolution was a rejection of pure objectivity in the field of history. The earlier ‘New
History’, including Frederick Jackson Turner, James Harvey Robinson, and Harry Elmer
Barnes, directly challenged the notion that history is merely the discovery and reportage
of what happened. History is not and can not be the recounting of facts by unbiased
spectators, as historians are inevitably concerned agents within history. Turner asserted
that  “each age writes  the history of  the past  anew with reference to the conditions
uppermost in its own time” (Turner 1939: 32). The purpose of history is then not to write
what  happened  from some  Archimedean  vantage  point,  but  to  understand  how  the
present, with all of its continuities, divisions, and values, came about. It is not a statement
of past facts, but a genetic account of the present.1
5 Further, the New Historians and their heirs understood their work as part of the ongoing
liberation  from  past  superstition  by  scientific  intelligence.  History  is  a  value-laden
endeavor by which the present is freed from the errors of the past. Hence, this is an
account  of  history  that  is  scientific  in  temper,  but  one  also  suspicious of  positivist
historians’ claim to be value-free in their recounting of the past. In the words of James
Kloppenberg, himself bo th a pragmatist historian and historian of pragmatism, “Becker
challenged the pretensions of ‘scientific’ history and argued instead that history consists
of a set of stories that enable ordinary people to locate themselves in the sea of time.
Becker conceived of knowledge, and of historical writing, as the product of pragmatic
communities  of  discourse”  (2004:  206;  see  also  Kloppenberg  1987).  They  understood
history to be a scientific discipline, but also humanistic (Strout 1958: 21-29).
6 This rejection of the spectatorial position resonates with Dewey’s own critique of the
spectator  theory  of  knowledge,  but  these  historians  were  not  necessarily  directly
influenced. No substantial connection between pragmatism and history appears to exist
until the interwar period. Classical pragmatist philosophers rarely wrote on the discipline
of history, with the most substantial exception being Dewey’s short selection on historical
judgments in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (Dewey 1938: 230-43). Similarly, the historians did
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not claim pragmatism as a direct influence.  Beard was a close friend of Dewey’s and
Becker once referenced pragmatism in his work, but neither presented themselves as
devotees.
7 However, there does seem to be a shared temper between pragmatism and certain anti-
objectivist strands of American historians. Becker wrote, “John Dewey’s books I find hard
to understand, but his ideas, coming to me from other writers, have confirmed a native
tendency to pragmatic theory” (Novick 1988:  151).  They shared a common sensibility
reflecting a faith in scientific method wedded to a suspicion of the quest for certain
knowledge.  “Pragmatism’s  crusade  against  the  worship  of  facts,  its  skepticism about
claims  of  objectivity,  its  consistent  reluctance  to  accept  a  hard-and-fast  fact-value
distinction,  its  emphasis  on  change  and  flux,  on  the  human  and  social  elements  in
knowledge, and the stress on the practical consequences of knowledge” were shared by
the anti-objectivist historians (Novick 1988: 153).
8 Correspondingly, Dewey shared his contemporary historian’s rejection of pure objectivity
in historical writing. Echoing James’ belief that “experience” is a double-barreled word,
Dewey held that “history” has a dual meaning:
History is that which happened in the past and it is the intellectual reconstruction
of these happenings at a subsequent time. The notion that historical inquiry simply
reinstates the events that once happened ‘as they actually happened’ is incredibly
naïve. It is a valuable methodological canon when interpreted as a warning to avoid
prejudice,  to  struggle  for  the  greatest  possible  amount  of  objectivity  and
impartiality,  and  as  an  exhortation  to  exercise  caution  and  skepticism  in
determining the authenticity of material presented as potential data. In any other
sense, it is meaningless. (1938: 236)
9 Objectivity is then a set of methodological principles bearing on the conduct of historians,
a regulative ideal that is not actually attainable.
10 If historical inquiry is not the reporting of objective facts by subject-less inquirers, then
how does it proceed? Why concern oneself with what happened in the past at all? Though
Dewey was sharply critical of the philosophical tradition tracing to the Greeks, it is wrong
to  conclude  that  Dewey believed it  was  possible  to  separate  oneself  from it.  Cruder
criticisms of pragmatism take it to be a blithe orientation to the future with no regard for
the  past.  However,  Dewey  and  other  pragmatists  continually  strove  to  wed  their
prospective and practical interests to historical-genetic analysis. Criticism of a tradition
requires engagement with and through it. The purpose of such engagement with the past
is not to put it in a museum exhibit as proof of our ability to catch it, or to hold it up as a
treasure to be admired, but to see how study of history is instrumental to a desirable
future. Put simply, the practical, future oriented interest is reconciled to the historical,
genetic one because historical inquiries are useful.
11 Much like the natural scientist or the engineer, the historian collects data and proposes
hypotheses that are tested in the course of future experimentation. It is not enough to
collect information about past events, but they must also present an interpretation of
those events which sets them in relation to one another and to the present. They are to
be “carried forward into the future by reasoning, then tested and validated in practice,
and used, it may be, by what might be called social engineering as a method of controlling
the  social  environment”  (Blau  1960:  96).  Judgments  about  historical  events  are  then
testable hypothetical reconstructions. “The writing of history is an instance of judgment
as  a  resolution  through  inquiry  of  a  problematic  situation”  (Dewey  1938:  232).  The
methods by which beliefs about history are warranted are no different in principle than
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those of science, though historical and scientific inquiries have different subject matters
and, thus, different tests.
12 To cite Dewey directly, “All historical construction is necessarily selective” (1938: 234). It is
selective  in  at  least  three  ways.  First,  previous  generations  selected  what  would  be
recorded and what would not. Second, folk memory chose what would be preserved in
their traditions and carry on to the present day for historians to observe. Third, present
historians  select  out  what  is  relevant  to  their  inquiries  and  what  is  not.  Data  is
discriminated from mere events when it is believed that it is relevant to the concern at
hand. “Apart from connection with some problem, they are like materials of brick, stone
and wood that a man might gather together who is intending to build a house but before
he has made a plan for building it” (Dewey 1938: 232). Clearly, the historian does not
study everything simultaneously, but instead makes judgments that some events were
more central than others. Whether a specific event lies at the center or the periphery is
dependent upon the interpretive framework and practical concerns of the historian.
13 The obvious and immediate objection is that historical judgments are true or false insofar
as they correspond to events that have already happened and thereby beyond our control
to make true. Whether Lee Harvey Oswald shot President John F. Kennedy is a matter for
the past and it is not up to us to say whether the proposition ‘Lee Harvey Oswald shot
President John F. Kennedy’ is true. Historical inquiries may discover fixed facts, but it
does not transform them into facts. Burleigh Wilkins, despite presenting a responsible
account of Dewey’s theory of historical inquiry, accused him irresponsibly of allowing the
historians to believe whatever they desired by strategic selection of facts to suit their
desired outcomes: “What are these in effect but alibis for the historian who wishes to
prejudge, or misjudge, the past? […] I fail  to see that history can fulfill  any function,
except for those who delight in playing tricks upon the dead” (Burleigh 1959: 885-84).
14 It  is  important  to  note  that  rejection of  Objectivity  and the  recognition of  selective
interest entail neither relativism nor skepticism. Ultimately, Burleigh’s argument rests on
the assumptions that the true historian discovers fixed events and that, once we accept
the presence of practical interest in historical inquiry, one has abandoned the search for
truth. The first assumption is rejected by the pragmatist for the reasons already given
and Burleigh offered no argument in response, except those that beg the question.
15 The second assumption is rejected by the pragmatist historian because of his conception
of truth as a regulative ideal that places limits on the desires of the individual historian.
Faith in scientific method entails a hope for consensus and the eventual reconstruction of
a problematic situation, while never forgetting that all answers are revisable in light of
further experience. To repeat with a sigh what pragmatists have been saying for years,
the pragmatist theory of truth does not reduce truth to what pleases the individual. It
may seem contradictory to assert both (a) historical judgments reflect selection of data,
proposal of hypotheses, and tests all motivated by our practical interests, and (b) whether
Lee Harvey Oswald shot JFK is not a matter of whether one desires it to be true. However,
there is a way through. The pragmatist holds that truth is something that happens to a
proposition through the process of experimentation. There is no sense of truth which
does not include a process of practically connecting concepts to perceptual experience. It
simply does not make sense to assert that something is true but has no continuity with
our own experience. To tweak Peirce’s example, it is like asserting that an object that no
one will ever, or could ever, encounter is hard. The proposition has no meaning. The
assertion that  JFK was  or  was  not  shot,  when radically  separated from any possible
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inquirer in the present, collapses. It has no meaning for us, and that is the only meaning
there  is.  We may assume the  position of  some Objective  observer,  but  this  God-like
position is either some actual present observer(s) or some imagined future observer(s).
16 Further, as noted, histories are selective. Some events are picked out as data while others
are not on the expectation that those selected events will prove worthwhile in ongoing
inquiry. If one were to write a history of the American presidency immediately prior to
JFK’s assassination, it would have a different data set from that written immediately after.
Lee Harvey Oswald would still  have led the life he did prior to the assassination, but
whether his life is counted as data for our inquiry, and the significance of events in his
life,  would take on radically new meaning. The meaning of the past,  and the truth of
historical judgments, are mutually determined as time moves forward. Historical writing
dialectically relates the meanings of the past and the present, changing both. In Joseph
Blau’s eloquent words, “each present has a new past” (1960: 99).
17 For  the  pragmatist  historian  historical  inquiry  is  then  necessarily  value-laden  and
selective rather than Objective and value-free.  This does not take place in a vacuum.
Behind historians and their inquiries is a broader social context that directs why they
inquire. “For historical inquiry is an affair (1) of selection and arrangement, and (2) is
controlled by the dominant problems and conceptions of the culture of the period in
which it  is  written” (Dewey 1938:  236).  The historian does not work from outside of
culture, but from within one shot-through with cultural problems and inherited cultural
frameworks. Historians’ problems are not exclusively their own.
There is no history except in terms of movement toward some outcome, something
taken as an issue, whether it be the Rise and the Fall of the Roman Empire, Negro
Slavery in the United States, the Polish Question, the Industrial Revolution or Land
Tenure. […] The urgency of the social problems which are now developing out of
the forces of industrial production and distribution is the source of a new interest
in  history  from  the  economic  point  of  view.  When  current  problems  seem
dominantly political, the political aspect of history is uppermost. (Dewey 1938: 237)
18 Like the philosopher or the social scientist, the historian is counter-intuitively concerned
with the present.2
19 Ultimately, the historian is concerned with the future as well, to address the underlying
cultural contradictions and to resolve the problems of the present. The present reaches
both backward and forward. “The selection of the end or outcome marks an interest and
the interest reaches into the future” (Dewey 1938: 237). And the discipline of history is
itself an intervention. “The writing of history is itself an historical event. It is something
which happens and which in its occurrence has existential consequences” (Dewy 1938:
237). The historian, however slightly, redirects history.
20 In sum, Dewey and many of Dewey’s contemporary historians abandoned the model of
the historian as reporter of mere happenings. Rather, history is a practically engaged,
value-laden practice that arises against its background cultural tensions and assumptions
and is inevitably oriented toward a desired future. It identifies problems and hopes to
resolve them by proposing and testing hypotheses / interpretive frameworks.
⁂
21 Dewey’s  associate George Boas provided a survey of  the problems an instrumentalist
history of philosophy would have to address: “(1) the specific end which the philosophical
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solution was devised to attain; (2) the possibility of a given solution’s being used for a
variety of ends; (3) the survival of obsolete questions and answers; (4) the rise of the
terminal value of obsolescent ideas” (Boas 1950: 87). Boas bemoaned the fact that no such
instrumentalist history of philosophy had not been written as of 1950. Arguably, it has
still not been written. However, if these are the tasks of an instrumentalist history of
philosophy,  then  it  is  clear  that  Dewey  was  attempting  to  write  one  in  Unmodern
Philosophy and Modern Philosophy. Here, Dewey tried to explain how it is that philosophers
developed solutions to contextualized problems and the unfortunate ways that  those
solutions have taken on a life of their own and continue to serve ends alien at the time of
their creation. To those who have read Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, there is
perhaps no need to explain further. What I have written so far may obviously inform the
central arguments of that text. However, for the sake of clarification, and for those who
are not yet familiar with Unmodern Philosophy, let us make the connections clear.
22 If historical writing is necessarily a selective enterprise governed by a practical concern
to resolve present difficulties, then we must identify what concern governs Unmodern
Philosophy. Most broadly, it is the same that animates Dewey’s thought generally; that is,
the desire to extend the operation of intelligence to morals – the realms of aesthetic
appreciation,  of  right  conduct,  fulfilling social  life,  and so on.  Therefore,  his  various
histories of philosophy are going to be concerned foremost not in recounting events, or
providing  a  sweeping  panorama  or  various  gestalten,  but  in  showing  the  frequently
frustrated work of intelligence. John Herman Randall, perhaps the best commentator on
Dewey’s historicism, stated, “Where Dewey approaches most closely to the narration of a
history  –  as  in  the  Reconstruction  in  Philosophy  –  it  is  in  following the  thread of  the
development of method. For him, it is method rather than vision that is fundamental in
the history of philosophy, t hat reflective and critical method that aims to reorganize and
reconstruct  beliefs”  (1939:  78-79).3 Similarly,  and  with  specific  reference  to  Dewey’s
writings  on  the  Greeks,  who  occupy  a  central  place  in  Dewey’s  historical  account,
Frederick Anderson wrote,  “most of John Dewey’s significant commentary on ancient
philosophy occurs within argument for some special phase of his own theory of inquiry.
The indication, I believe, is that, in Dewey’s eyes, the study of Greek philosophy should
not be thought of primarily as the occupation of a special academic task force, but a
continuing  reinterpretation  that  is  of  general  importance  within  contemporary
philosophy” (1967: 86).4
23 Unmodern  Philosophy  takes  method as  its  central  concern,  and not  only  in  the  latter
conceptual half. The first three chapters engage in a roughly anthropological account of
the origin of Western philosophy in the conflicts within and between cultures. Philosophy
in  any  era  is  a  reflective  response  to  concrete  social  conditions.  At  the  origin  of
philosophy, increased commerce and contact between cultures called into the question
the narratives that societies tell to make sense of life. Conflicting narratives produced the
need to invent the very notion of a fundamental object of thought, and correspondingly,
the  notion  of  a method  of  thinking.  Agrarian  and  industrial  models  of  Nature,
corresponding to basic Greek ways of life, were proposed to make sense of lived conflicts.
24 These incompatible narratives (and others) then necessitated a new problematization:
“How is rational discourse possible?” (36).  It is the discovery of logical method itself.
Similarly, it is the identification of a proper object for thought – Nature itself. In Dewey’s
narrative, Plato’s search for method and its object was never far from his moral concern
to develop a legislative art that will overcome the disintegration of Athenian culture and
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recapture their prior easy harmony. Sadly, with Aristotle, the limitations of Greek logic –
themselves reflective of Greek social contradictions and language and of the poor state of
natural  science  –  prevented  a  proper  theory  of  inquiry  and  its  object  from  being
developed. “The state of invention and technology rendered any adequate experimental
analysis of  nature impossible.  The best that can be done under such conditions is to
organize and define critically what is already believed, and the body of existing beliefs in
absence of any technique of systematic discovery had of necessity developed accidentally
and causally” (50). Aristotle reached the heights of what was possible, given the problems
and methods available  to  an ancient  Greek,  but  his  organum was critically  flawed.  It
encompassed a logic of discovery, but not one of experimentation. What is worse, Plato’s
essential  connection between method and morals was lost  as the theoretical  and the
practical were severed.
25 As  cultural  conditions  changed,  the  problematizations  shifted  as  well5.5 With  the
Medievals, the problem of method and its object was supernaturalized into one of the
relation between levels of reality. With the moderns, ‘How is rational discourse possible?’
became  ‘Is  knowledge  possible?’  Corresponding  to  new  problematizations  came  new
objects: for the Medievals, it was the God as articulated in the synthesizing institution of
the Church and, for the moderns, it is the Object which is somehow other than the Subject
yet somehow potentially an object of knowledge.
26 Dewey’s history of philosophy then periodizes time and, like other historians’, it contains
an agenda. Periodizations make claims about history’s pivotal moments and arcs, and
predict where it is headed, for good or ill. Rather than a Christian two-era periodization,
in which time is divided into a period of darkness and another of redemption following
the  appearance  of  Christ,  or  a  Renaissance  three-era  periodization  in  which  time  is
divided into Greek heights, a Medieval Dark Age, and then a time of classical rebirth,
Dewey offers a four-era interpretive model. Like the Renaissance Humanists, he sees a
height of a limited humanistic naturalism, a fallow period (while also recognizing the
Church as a successful synthesis of its culture), and the promise of a new humanistic
naturalism with the advent of modern science. However, the new naturalism has so far
failed.6
27 For Dewey, modernity is still a project and he combined a strong sense of modernity’s
newness with frustration at its failure to realize. In writing Unmodern Philosophy, Dewey
repeatedly  returned  to  Matthew  Arnold’s  description  of  modernity  as  “Wandering
between two worlds, one dead / The other powerless to be born” and we (un)moderns
“have a  sense that  their  system is  not  their  own creation,  and that  it  by no means
corresponds exactly with the wants of their actual life; that, for them, it is customary, not
rational. The awakening of this sense is the awakening of the modern spirit” (92).7 Hence, we
come to the pragmatist historian’s concern for the future.
28 The next period has not yet happened. We do not have a naturalized account of knowing,
but epistemology. The latter reflects the problematization originated by the Greeks and
modified by the Medievals and (Un)moderns, but never overcome. Dewey’s history of
philosophy is then not oriented to recount simply what happened, but to stage a critical
intervention into  that  history,  to  introduce  a  change  in  existential  conditions  going
forward.  By  producing a  selective  narrative,  he  is  hoping  to  provoke  a  certain
interpretive model in the reader and thereby clear the way for a better future. Ultimately,
Dewey is trying to recover the connection between method and morals that he found in
Plato, though certainly not the same method, nor the same morals. As cited above, the
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historian’s  selective  interest  is  futural.  Dewey  is  not  writing  a  critical  history  of
philosophy out of a pure concern to report the events, but because it makes way for a
naturalistic culture of inquiry, a democratic community that attends to experience.
⁂
29 Recently, David Bourget and David Chalmers conducted a survey of philosophical beliefs
on  thirty  issues  they  took  to  be  central  to  the  discipline  (Bourget  and Chalmers
forthcoming).  The answers they received are not  as  important as  the questions they
asked and who they asked them of. Of those thirty questions, one was on aesthetics, one
on philosophy of religion, three or four were on meta-ethics (depending on whether one
considers the issue of free will to be primarily an ethical concern), two were on ethics,
and one on politics. The twenty-one remaining questions regarded issues of epistemology
and metaphysics.  Perversely, there were more questions regarding the significance of
teleporters and zombies than either politics, God, or aesthetics. And of the two ethics
questions, one regarded whether one should reroute the trolley in the famed thought
experiment. To their credit, Bourget and Chalmers acknowledge that their survey sample
was drawn primarily from analytic philosophers at elite, mainstream universities with
Ph.D. programs. But perhaps this admission is itself an unintentional condemnation of
the state of the dominant anglophilic conversation.
30 Dewey  repeatedly  complained  that  epistemology-centered  philosophy  addresses  the
problems of  philosophers  rather  than the  problems of  men.  Unless  English-speaking
society truly considers the questions of faith, goodness, justice and beauty to run far
second to those of knowledge and Being (and zombies and teleporters),  then Dewey’s
complaint would appear to be true today. And insofar as those questions focus on the
very possibility of knowledge of existence rather than how to know and exist well, then
he was all  the more correct  in his  analysis.  Dewey’s  Unmodern Philosophy and Modern
Philosophy provides a critical genealogy that is perhaps familiar to those who know his
other  works,  but  it  is  still  needed despite  its  familiarity.  Dewey’s  history of  western
philosophy looks to the future, toward the democratic culture that is synonymous with a
culture of inquiry.  It  is a prospective history of philosophy that clears the way for a
naturalize account of  knowing that,  Dewey hoped,  would produce a richer and more
humane community.
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NOTES
1. For an analysis of Dewey and Foucault on histories of the present, and of a possible Deweyan
influence on Foucault, see Auxier 2002. For more by Auxier on Dewey, religion and history, see
Auxier 1990.
2. In an impressively foreshadowing passage immediately after the one just quoted, Dewey then
turns to those who write history out of their concern for climatic changes.
3. Randall’s work has faded from the conversation, but he deserves a rediscovery. For more from
Randall  directly relevant to the present article,  see (Randall  1958,  3-13,  35,  39-44,  56-61;  and
Randall 1963, esp. 13-27, 79).
4. My thanks to Albert Randall Spencer for making me aware of this text.
5. “Problematizations”  is  knowingly  taken  from  the  thought  of  Michel  Foucault.  It  is  no
coincidence that the intersection between Dewey and Foucault has appeared in recent writings
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on pragmatist historicism. Randall Auxier’s work was mentioned in a previous footnote. I would
highlight Colin Koopman’s work on Dewey, Foucault and problematization (Koopman 2010, and
Koopman 2011).
6. Had I the space in this article, I would investigate the possibility of a parallel genealogy of
critique  in  Dewey’s  history  of  philosophy.  Parallel  to  Foucault’s  extensive  genealogy  of
disciplinary power/governmentality, he also wrote a short account of the rise of critical reason/
Enlightenment.  Given  Dewey’s  all  too  brief  mention  of  the  progressive  element  of  modern
philosophy, the possibility of a similar genealogy of critique is intriguing (170-74).
7. As editor of the manuscripts, I can testify that Dewey typed this entire passage out in draft
after draft (as well as Malikowski’s definition of culture).
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